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DETERMINANTS OF FDI INTO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Hang Bich Phung
Ilaria Ossella-Durbal, Advisor
October 19th 2016

I. Introduction1
Evidence of foreign direct investment (FDI) 2 , which often refers to investment made by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) in foreign countries, can be traced back to before the 1950s under
the form of the transfer of capital between developed countries. This channel of capital transferring
did not attract much attention from scholars until its huge surge in the 1980s due to a shift in FDI
flows from developed countries to developing countries. Average FDI inflows to developing
countries nearly doubled between 1980 – 1985 and 1985 – 1990. Furthermore, starting in 1990, the
share of FDI flows to developing countries increased while it decreased to developed countries.
Between 1994 and 2014, the share of FDI inflows to developing countries increased from 37% to
57.7%, surpassing the share to developed countries. This shift in the distribution of FDI raises the
question of what is driving such a change.
The period 1980 – 1995 when FDI inflows started increasing to developing countries is also
associated with the liberalization of many developing countries. Prior to 1980, Latin American
countries suffered from a debt crisis and the failure of their import substitution policies. Thus, many
Latin American countries opened up their economies in 1980 in order to help their economies recover,
by lowering trade barriers and privatizing state owned companies. Consequently, FDI inflows into
Latin America surged during 1980 – 1984, contributing to the 3% growth of FDI inflows into
developing countries. In 1985, China began steadily opening up its economy due to its lack of capital
after the failure of the Cultural Revolution. As a result, FDI inflows into developing countries during
the period 1985 – 1990 grew at the considerable rate of 22%. India also opened up its economy after
its currency crisis in 1991 and implemented a series of reforms. Both the liberalization of China and
India led to a 54% growth rate of FDI to Asia in 1993.
FDI flows from country to country when there exist incentives on the part of both investors and
recipient countries. The motives for MNEs investing abroad include entering new markets, taking
advantage of natural resources, or internalizing the production process of intermediate goods. On the
other hand, recipient countries welcome FDI as it can bring about economic growth, technological
spillovers, and generate employment. For developing countries, investment from abroad plays a vital
role especially at the early stage of economic development. As explained by Rosenstein-Rodan’s big
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All statistics in this section were obtained from the UNCTAD World Investment Reports.
Formal definition of FDI by the World Bank: “Foreign direct investment are the net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor.”
2

Mark Israel Economic Fellowship Research 2016, Hang Phung

Advisor: Ilaria Ossella-Durbal

push model 3 , least developed countries are often trapped in poverty because they lack the large
amount of capital necessary to initiate sufficient investment to address coordination failure and
accelerate their economic development. As a result, they tend to seek out official development
assistance or attract FDI to fuel the development of capital-intensive industries.
In the early stages of economic development, developing countries tend to attract mainly
investment in primary resources due to their relative abundance in labor force and natural resources,
and their lack of infrastructure and human capital. However, as a country develops, it has more
advantages to offer, such as better financial and political regulations, and production tends to shift
away from primary products and traditional manufacturing to more progressive industries. In 1970,
natural resources accounted for approximately 23% of the world FDI stock, as compared to 31% in
services. By 1990, only 11% of the world FDI stock was in natural resources, while 50% of it was in
services. From 1990 – 2002, 7% of the FDI stock in developing countries was invested in natural
resources, while FDI in services increased from 47% to 55% of the total stock of FDI into those
countries during the same period. This shift in FDI suggests that the flows to developing countries
from 1990 to present have shifted towards service and knowledge – capital intensive industries. In
particular, in several Latin American countries, industries requiring large-scale financing such as
electricity, telecoms, and water attracted a large amount of FDI flows in the years when the
government privatized those industries. Furthermore, in the mid-1990s, FDI accounted for
approximately 10% of investment funds for the electricity industry in China. In India, 60% of FDI
went towards infrastructural and manufacturing projects during the period 1991 – 1995, but from
2003 to 2004 investment shifted towards information and communication technology industries.
Despite the global trend of a sectoral shift in FDI, African countries, unfortunately, have lagged
behind in this trend. It was not until 2012 that FDI inflows showed a sectoral shift in Africa. Since
1980 FDI inflows have been predominantly invested in the primary sector, while services and
especially manufacturing industries have only attracted more investment recently. Furthermore,
Africa’s share of FDI inflows, on average, accounted for 2.4% of world FDI inflows during 1980 –
1984 and increased only to 4.4% in 2015. It is possible that many countries in this region are
considered too risky for investment due to the existing political instability.
Overall, the incentives for FDI vary vastly across time periods and regions. A preliminary analysis
suggests that since 1990, investors tend to look for countries which can provide them with advantages
in services and knowledge – capital intensive manufacturing industries. These advantages include the
human capital stock and market size of the host country. On the other hand, considering a longer
period, from 1980 to 2014, the more predominant advantages are natural resources and labor force.
In this paper, we study two questions regarding what drives FDI to developing countries. First, what
are the determinants that make specific developing countries more attractive as a destination of FDI?
Secondly, have these determinants differed between the time period 1980 – 2014 and 1990 – 2014?
We follow the seminal work by Dunning as the theoretical basis for our empirical model and consider
as many developing countries as possible given data limitations.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical
background of FDI studies in general. Then, we introduce and review the empirical literature. The
3
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fourth section specifies the empirical model, followed by the data and methodology sections. Lastly,
the seventh section discusses our results, while the eighth concludes.
II. Theoretical Background
Literature on foreign direct investment and the incentives for investors to operate abroad
flourished in the 1970s. The two theories which were most prominently discussed are based on
neoclassical trade theory and internalization theory. The former, introduced in the 1960s, was built
upon the main argument of the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) trade model to explain the motives behind
investors who operate production chains abroad, but export products back to their home country. The
theory argues that, because of heterogeneity in countries’ endowments, there exist incentives for
foreign firms to transfer their abundant production factor to where the returns on the factor are higher.
Thus, with these incentives, foreign firms will keep locating factories in different countries until factor
prices are equalized.
The other main stream theory, internalization theory, which was introduced by Buckley and
Casson in 1976, also examines the motivation behind FDI. Instead of outsourcing different parts of
the production process, this theory points to the fact that internalizing these processes is likely the
least expensive way for MNEs to benefit from a foreign market due to lower transaction costs. A
prominent example is when a foreign firm owns an innovative technology, the best way to profit from
it in a new market is to internalize the production chain in that market. This way, firms can reduce
the risk that their technology is stolen and expect higher profits because of lower transaction costs.
In 1992, these two theories were combined by Dunning to form his OLI paradigm, a seminal
framework that has been widely used as the foundation for empirically examining the determinants
of FDI. According to Dunning (1988), the OLI paradigm consists of 3 sub paradigms from which one
can analyze the reasons why firms engage in FDI (or increase existing FDI): ownership (O), location
(L), and internalization (I). The first sub paradigm (ownership), which is closely related to the
argument derived from the HO model, explains that specific competitive advantages of foreign firms
are one of the motives behind foreign investment. These advantages range from technological
advantages to specific expertise and managerial skills, which enable foreign firms to operate
profitably in the host country despite not being a local company. The second sub paradigm (location)
explains that investment abroad provides MNEs with some immobile advantages specific to the host
countries, such as cheap domestic labor, natural resources, and favorable regulations. The third sub
paradigm (internalization), largely influenced by Buckley and Casson’s internalization theory, points
to the benefit of foreign investment from acquiring companies abroad to internalize the production
process of intermediate goods. This sub paradigm argues that as long as the benefit of engaging in
FDI to produce intermediate goods is higher than that of granting the right to local firms, MNEs are
likelier to remain involved in these activities themselves.
Combining the different aspects of these paradigms, Dunning categorizes the incentives of
investors into three types: market seeking, resource seeking, and efficiency seeking. Market seeking
investment is based on the premise of seeking new consumer bases. This type of investor is interested
in entering a new market or introducing a new product, especially where their market power and profit
can be maximized. Thus, market seeking FDI is often directed towards import substituting countries.
To overcome import barriers, these investors establish factories and produce their product inside the
3
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host country’s borders. Moreover, it is even more beneficial to market seeking investors when the
host country also provides them with location advantages, such as a cheap labor force, to facilitate
their production process. Market seeking investors are thus highly concerned with both the potential
consumer base and likely production resources of their host countries. On the other hand, natural
resources, labor force, and trade openness are considered critical by resource seeking investors. These
investors prefer export oriented host countries, and mainly seek out countries with exportable
resources and an open trade policy to either export their resources back to the investors’ home country
or to engage in the regional market. Some determinants considered attractive by resource seeking
investors are trade openness, labor force, and natural resources. Last but not least, the potential type
of investment geared towards emerging countries is efficiency seeking FDI. Under the circumstance
that a market is already well established in the host country, efficiency seeking investors who possess
highly efficient production processes can still make a profitable investment abroad by taking
advantage of economies of specialization and scope across value chains. These investors look for
higher quality human capital, stable governments, and high quality infrastructure as necessary preconditions for investment. As new markets become difficult to establish, investment from abroad
gradually shifts towards the efficiency seeking type.
III. Empirical Literature Review
The advantage of using Dunning’s theory as a framework for empirical studies of FDI lies in its
flexibility, as it allows for a variety of factors to be considered as determinants of FDI depending on
the investment decisions of MNEs. Based on this framework, FDI studies have narrowed down the
potential determinants of FDI to include market size, macroeconomic stability, trade, financial
development, infrastructure, natural resources, labor skill, and labor force. Of these determinants,
market size, labor force and macroeconomic stability are important to market seeking investors;
natural resources and trade openness affect resource seeking investors; and financial development,
infrastructure, and labor skill are critical to efficiency seeking investors. These variables, though
strongly supported by theoretical arguments, however, have not been consistently proven to be
significant in all empirical work. After surveying key empirical studies, Chakrabarti (2001) concludes
that the only empirically supported FDI determinant is market size, while empirical evidence for other
determinants is not congruous. In this next section, we review the theoretical arguments, following
Dunning’s theory closely, as well as the empirical evidence, and the measurements commonly used
for FDI determinants.
a. Market Size, Macroeconomic Stability, and Trade Openness
Market size, macroeconomic stability, and trade openness are three classic explanatory variables
used in any study of FDI4, not only due to the weight of their theoretical arguments but also because
of their significance in empirical studies. To maximize their return on investment, market seeking
investors are highly concerned with the size of their possible consumer base, while resource seeking
investors prefer countries with an open trade policy. Macroeconomic stability is considered a
necessary precondition by all three types of investor, as less volatility in potential returns is more
Nunnenkamp & Spatz (2002); Yasmin, Hussain, & Chaudhary (2003); Janicki & Wunnava (2004); ÇEviŞ & Çamurdan (2007);
Kok & Acikgoz Ersoy (2009); Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011); Basu, Chakraborty, & Reagle (2003); Kolstad & Villanger (2008);
Škuflić & Botrić (2006); Al-Sadig (2009); Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001); Williams (2015); Krifa-Schneider & Matei
(2010); Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007); Busse, & Hefeker (2007); Chakrabarti (2001)
4
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likely. Of these three determinants, market size is widely accepted as a significant determinant of FDI,
according to the survey conducted by Chakrabarti (2001), while trade openness and macroeconomic
stability remain under dispute. However, as all these variables are considered important in the
theoretical literature, they are all included in our model.
The proxies for market size which are widely accepted and have been found to be statistically
significant and positive are GDP and GDP per capita (Chakrabarti, 2001). The difference between the
two measures are their interpretation, where GDP represents market size in general, while GDP per
capita indicates the consumer base of the country. Since the focus of our study is developing countries,
where both GDP and population size vary greatly, we believe GDP per capita to be a more suitable
proxy for market size for the purpose of this research.
As stated previously, both trade and macroeconomic stability have been included in many studies
with mixed results. However, the majority of the empirical studies we reviewed found trade to be
significant, despite considering different groups of countries and time spans5. Trade is found to be
insignificant though in the study by Montero (2008). Macroeconomic stability, on the other hand,
which is measured by inflation (GDP deflator), is significant in the studies by Al-Sadig (2009), Asiedu
(2006), Çevis & Çamurdan (2007), Ranjan & Agrawal (2011), and Williams (2015), while it poses
no significant impact on FDI in the studies by Adams (2010), Busse & Hefeker (2007), Kolstad &
Villanger (2008), and Montero (2008). It is possible that these mixed results could be due to the
differences in time spans and considered countries. In our study, we choose the classical
measurements, trade volume as a percentage of GDP and inflation, as proxies for trade openness and
macroeconomic stability.
b. Labor Factors (labor force and labor skill)
In the OLI framework, Dunning refers to a large and cheap labor force as a location advantage of
developing countries because this advantage is immobile and specific to the host country. This factor
incentivizes resource and market seeking investors to locate their production processes in the host
country to lower production costs, to overcome import substituting trade barriers, or to take advantage
of their trade openness. Indeed, many empirical papers6 have considered the significance of the labor
force in driving FDI. The proxies for labor force that have been found to be significant are labor force
participation rate7, labor force growth8, population stock9, and population growth10. The first measure
is deemed the most accurate in capturing a country’s labor force. However, since that data are not
available until 1990, we also consider the working age population as a percentage of total population
in order to examine a longer time series.
Studies that include labor skill as a primary driver of FDI are not as extensive as ones that consider
other classical determinants, even though a high level of human capital, as a key factor to increase
production efficiency, is considered attractive by foreign investors in the theoretical literature. The
5

Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Quazi, (2007), Ranjan & Agrawal (2011), Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011), Williams
(2015), Yasmin, Hussain, & Chaudhary (2003), Al-Sadig (2009), and Busse & Hefeker (2007)
6 Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011), Neumayer & Spess, 2005; Kok & Acikgoz Ersoy
(2009), Al-Sadig (2009)
7 Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011)
8 Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001)
9 Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011), Neumayer & Spess (2005), Kok & Acikgoz Ersoy (2009)
10 Al-Sadig (2009)
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problem is due to the lack of a precise measurement for labor skill (Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef,
2001). Widely used indicators as proxies for human capital which have been found to be significant
are secondary school enrollment11 and literacy rate12. As argued by Al-Sadig (2009) and according to
Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), secondary education is regarded as the most important
element in human resource development. This is because it completes the provision of basic education
that began at the primary level, and aims at laying the foundations for lifelong learning and human
development, by offering more subject- or skill-oriented instruction using more specialized teachers.
Thus, we focus on secondary school enrollment as a proxy for human capital.
Gemmell (1996), on the other hand, argues that secondary school enrollment is not the best
measurement of human capital because it does not measure the stock of human capital but rather the
flow of human capital. Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001) use an indicator created by Nehru,
Swanson, and Dubey (1995) to specifically measure the human capital stock, which they found to be
significant. As this data set is not easily available, Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001) suggest
considering the Barro&Lee education data set as a substitute, since both data sets are highly correlated.
The disadvantage of the Barro&Lee education data lies in its time gaps, since the data are only
available every 5 years. However, it provides measures such as the average years of schooling and
percentage of the population that completes secondary education, which capture the education level
of a country in a more precise way than gross secondary enrollment levels.
c. Infrastructure
Infrastructure, like macroeconomic stability, inflation, and trade openness, is also a classical
variable used in studying FDI13, as it is arguably an important precondition for efficiency seeking
investment. The low quality of infrastructure in developing countries is not favorable to investors
because it increases both production and transportation costs and reduces efficiency. Quality
infrastructure can also indicate a richer consumer base of the host country. Thus, a host country with
better infrastructure is preferred by investors.
Proxies for infrastructure that have been found to be significant are electric power consumption14,
mobile cellular subscriptions15, electric power transmission and distribution losses16, internet17, and
fixed telephone subscriptions18. Fixed telephone subscriptions has been used predominantly in many
studies (Asiedu, 2006; Majocchi & Strange, 2007; Ranjan & Agrawal, 2011; Williams, 2015).
However, considering the fact that information technology has advanced incredibly since the last
decade, using this measurement as a proxy for infrastructure given this study’s time frame seems
flawed. Out of the four remaining indicators, we find mobile cellular subscriptions and electric power
transmission and distribution losses (% of output) the most appropriate, given that these indicators
have less missing data than the others.

11

Yasmin, Hussain, & Chaudhary (2003), Al-Sadig (2009), Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001)
Asiedu (2006)
13 Asiedu (2006); Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011); Quazi (2007); Adams (2010); Asiedu (2006); Majocchi & Strange (2007);
Ranjan & Agrawal (2011); Jiménez (2011)
14 Ranjan & Agrawal (2011)
15 Quazi (2007); Shahmoradi & Baghbanyan (2011)
16 Jiménez (2011)
17 Kok & Acikgoz Ersoy (2009)
18 Asiedu (2006), Majocchi & Strange (2007), Ranjan & Agrawal (2011), Williams (2015)
12
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d. Natural Resources
Many African and Latin American countries are considered to be an attractive destination for
resource seeking investors, due to their large amounts of natural resources which act as a pulling
factor for FDI (Asiedu, 2006; Montero, 2008). As these countries represent a large group of
developing countries, it is important to investigate the impact of natural resources on the amount of
FDI received by host countries. A study done by Neumayer & Spess (2005) used mineral rents (% of
GDP) as a proxy for natural resources, while Asiedu (2006) and Montero (2008) used fuel exports as
a percentage of merchandise exports. Both indicators capture the availability of natural resources and
are found to be significant drivers of FDI. Since data are more available for the latter measure, we
follow the work of Asiedu (2006) and Montero (2008) and use fuel exports as a percentage of
merchandise exports as a proxy for natural resources.
e. Financial Development Level
As the structure of FDI shifts from natural resources to efficiency seeking incentives, the role of
financial development becomes more important for several reasons. Once efficiency seeking investors
determine the inefficient market they want to engage in, their construction of production facilities
requires financial guarantees. As a result, efficiency seeking investors would prefer a freer and more
developed financial market to diminish financial risk (Gouidar & Nouira, 2014). Secondly, MNEs
also rely on domestic industries within the host country for inputs and intermediate products, and
countries with a more developed financial market will promise a faster establishment of these
backward linkages (Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Sayek, 2004). Therefore, host countries with
well-developed financial markets will be more attractive to investors.
Empirically, financial development has been studied both separately as a determinant of FDI and
as one of the many drivers of FDI19. Albulescu, Briciu, & Coroiu (2010) in studying the impact of the
financial market on FDI consider a vast number of financial variables 20 and find that financial
development has a significant impact on FDI. One of the variables used by Albulescu, Briciu, &
Coroiu (2010), interest spread, was also used in the study by Brada, Kutan, & Yigit (2006) and found
to be statistically significant. Additionally, Gouidar & Nouira (2014), Githaiga, Nyauncho, &
KABIRU (2015), and Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001) all find domestic credit to the private
sector statistically significant as a proxy for financial development, arguing that domestic credit to
the private sector represents the opposite of stagnation in the financial market, and is therefore an
appropriate measurement of financial development.
Among the different proxies for financial development, we find domestic credit to the private
sector more appropriate given the developing countries we are studying, as it captures more fully the
theoretical arguments for financial development: the openness level of the host country’s financial
market, the availability of financial support for private companies, and implicitly the financial
development of the host country. Therefore, we believe it to be a better measure than interest spread
for the development level of the financial sector.

19

Gouidar & Nouira (2014), Githaiga, Nyauncho, & KABIRU (2015), Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Sayek (2004); Albulescu,
Briciu, & Coroiu (2010); Brada, Kutan, & Yigit (2006); Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef, (2001)
20 These include market capitalization (% of GDP), current account deficit (% of GDP), banking reform & interest rate liberalization,
interest rate spread, etc.
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IV. Model Specification
Given the framework introduced by Dunning and the existing empirical literature, this study will
adopt the following regression model to investigate the determinants of FDI:
𝐹𝐷𝐼 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽2 𝑀𝐾𝑆𝑍 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑇𝐴𝐵 + 𝛽4 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑅𝐴 + 𝛽6 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑆 + 𝛽7 𝐿𝐵𝐹𝐶 + 𝛽8 𝐿𝐵𝑆𝐾 + 𝜀

where,
FDI
FIN
MKSZ
STAB
TRADE
INFRA
NATS
LBFC
LBSK

is foreign direct investment
is financial development level
is market size
is macroeconomic stability
is level of trade openness
is infrastructure
is natural resources
is quantity of labor resource (labor force)
is quality of labor resource (labor skill)

Expected signs
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

The choice of FDI measurement varies vastly across empirical studies and includes FDI stock21,
logged FDI inflows22, logged real FDI inflows23, logged FDI per capita24, FDI inflows as a percentage
of GDP25, and logged FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP26. Of these measurements, the two that are
used predominantly in the empirical literature are logged FDI inflows and FDI inflows as a percentage
of GDP.
For the scope of this study, we adopt logged FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP to be the proxy
for the dependent variable. Because our focus is developing countries, where the sizes of the
economies vary a great deal, one needs to be aware of the possibility of large country effects, which
can skew the distribution of FDI and create less robust results. Thus, without diminishing the
importance of FDI, we divide FDI inflows by the country’s GDP (FDIGDP) to smooth out a possibly
skewed distribution and take the natural logarithm of FDIGDP to linearize the relationship between
FDIGDP and the independent variables.
V. Data
Three decades ago, total FDI inflows to Latin American and African countries contributed to the
majority of FDI inflows into developing countries, with investors mainly seeking natural resources.
However, with the rise of China, India, and some South East Asian countries in the beginning of the
1990s, FDI inflows shifted away from Latin American towards Asian countries. Furthermore, in the
1990s, FDI inflows to developing countries showed a sectoral shift, away from primary resources and
traditional manufacturing towards service and knowledge – capital intensive manufacturing. To

Stock Nunnenkamp & Spatz (2002), Bénassy‐Quéré, Coupet, & Mayer (2007)
Ranjan & Agrawal (2011), Kapuria-Foreman (2007)
23 Neumayer & Spess (2005)
24 Al-Sadig (2009), Kolstad & Villanger (2008), Busse & Hefeker (2007)
25 Noorbakhsh, Paloni, & Youssef (2001), Asiedu (2006), Williams (2015), Montero (2008)
26 Krifa-Schneider & Matei (2010)
21
22
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investigate this shift away from resource seeking to market and efficiency seeking, we consider two
time spans in this study: 1990 – 2014 and 1980 – 2014.
As stated previously, the focus of this study is developing countries27, which can be quite diverse.
We thus consider as large a group of developing countries as possible, spanning different regions of
the world, based on data availability. Specifically, we include countries from Africa, Asia, Latin and
South America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific Ocean.
Due to lack of consistently available data, we actually apply the empirical model to 3 different
data sets: 1990, 1980, and Barro&Lee. All 3 data sets include all developing countries for which data
are available and, wherever possible we use the same indicators for all of the FDI determinants.
Unfortunately, of the eight determinants we consider in our model, there are three measures that do
not extend before 1990. Thus, the 1990 data set contains all the preferred measures (except for labor
skill), while the 1980 data set contains substitutes for the unavailable measures. The Barro&Lee data
set instead contains a preferred measure for labor skill.
The following sections discuss each data set in more detail. All of the measures used in our study
are obtained from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank, except for percentage of
population aged 15 and over having completed secondary education, which is obtained from the
Barro&Lee education data set. The countries included in each data set are listed in Table 1, while data
sources and variables are summarized in Table 2.
a. 1990 Data Set
This data set contains the more appropriate indicators for all determinants except for labor skill.
Those indicators are domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) for financial development, inflation,
GDP deflator (annual %) for macroeconomic instability, trade (% GDP) for trade openness, fuel
exports (% of merchandise exports) for natural resources, GDP per capita, purchasing power parity
(PPP) (constant 2011 international $) for market size, mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)
for infrastructure, and labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) for labor
force. Moreover, we measure labor skill by school enrollment, secondary (% gross). Based on data
availability, this data set includes 45 countries and spans 25 years from 1990 to 2014. There are 10
more African countries in this data set than in the 1980 data set, while the number of countries from
other regions are similar across the data sets.
b. 1980 Data Set
This data set includes 30 countries with a time series spanning 35 years from 1980 to 2014. In
order to extend the 1990 time series by 10 years, we needed to change some of the indicators used for
certain determinants. Specifically, the variables used to measure market size, infrastructure, and labor
force are changed to GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$), electric power transmission and
distribution losses (% of output), and population ages 15-64 (% of total). Due to the unavailability of
data for GDP per capita, (PPP) (constant 2011 international $) before 1990, we use the indicator
GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) as a substitute since it is highly correlated with the original
27

We followed the World Bank classification of developing countries, ones with GNI per capita of less than or equal to $12,475.
Particularly, developing countries are ones whose economies are categorized as low ($1,025 or less), lower-middle ($1,026 - $4,035),
and upper-middle ($4,036 - $12,475) income.
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measure. For the same reason, labor force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+)
is replaced with an indicator representing the working age population, population ages 15-64 (% of
total). The measurement for infrastructure, electric power transmission and distribution losses (% of
output), substitutes mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) to represent the development of
hard infrastructure, as compared to the latter which captures the development of communication and
technology. For all the other determinants, the variables used are the same as those of the 1990 data
set.
c. Barro&Lee Data Set
In both data sets above, school enrollment, secondary (% gross) is used as the human capital
proxy. In this data set, instead, we use the indicator percentage of population aged 15 and over having
completed secondary education from the Barro&Lee education data set to measure human capital.
This indicator captures the level of human capital of developing countries better than secondary
education enrollment because it measures the stock of human capital instead of the flows. This data
set contains 34 countries across different regions, which are distributed similarly to the 1980 data set,
and spans the years 1980 – 2014. However, because the Barro&Lee education data are only available
every 5 years, this data set contains only 7 periods. All of the other variables, which are measured
using the same proxies as the 1980 data set and are available yearly, are averaged every 5 years to fit
with the setup of the Barro&Lee data.
Descriptive statistics for all data sets are presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Average FDI as a
percentage of GDP is about 2% for the 1980 data set and 3% for the 1990 data set, with respective
standard deviations of 3.06 and 2.42. Though China is the largest FDI recipient in the world, it is not
the largest recipient of FDI relative to economy size. Its FDI inflows peaked at 6.21% in 1993 and
have fluctuated between 3% - 6% ever since. Across all data sets and periods, Jordan is the largest
recipient of FDI relative to its economy size, receiving approximately 23.53% in 2006, followed by
Panama which received 16.23% in the same year. Interestingly, Panama is also the country with the
least amount of FDI inflows out of all countries, receiving -11.53% in 198828. Of the countries with
only positive FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP, Algeria and Bangladesh received the least amount
of FDI inflows, roughly 0%, for most of the period 1980 – 1995. When considering FDI inflows as
percentage of GDP, most Asian countries have not been the largest recipients of FDI, but some Asian
countries such as Thailand, India, Malaysia, and China have had the more stable FDI inflows since
1980. The average FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP for Thailand, India, Malaysia, and China are
2.3%, 0.8%, 3.97% and 2.79% respectively.
VI. Methodology
To avoid spurious estimation, we employ six unit root tests29 to investigate the stationarity of all
variables in both the 1990 and 1980 data sets. Since the Barro&Lee data set has time gaps, unit root
tests are not applicable. Our stationary test results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Based on these test

28
29

Negative FDI inflows imply that the amount of disinvestment is larger than the amount of FDI flows into the country that year.
Levin, Lin and Chu; Im, Pesaran, and Shin; ADF Fisher; Breitung; Hadri; and Harris-Tzavalis
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results, the variables are either expressed in levels or first order differences depending on which
transformation is stationary30/31.
Our study investigates three different data sets, all of which are panel data. Thus, we consider
three regression models: pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects. Since our data sets contain
30 countries or more, the unobserved individual heterogeneity could be better addressed by using the
fixed effects model to cover the possible correlation between the heterogeneity and the independent
variables. We run the Hausman test for all regressions to check whether the fixed effects or random
effects model is more efficient. Based on these test results, we apply the fixed effects model to the
1980 and the Barro&Lee data sets, while the random effects model is applied to the 1990 data set.
Moreover, the F-tests confirm that the fixed effects model is more appropriate than pooled OLS for
both the 1980 and Barro&Lee data sets, while the Breusch Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test confirms
that the random effects model is more appropriate than pooled OLS for the 1990 data set. These test
results are presented in Table 8.
VII. Results
All of the regression results for the different data sets are presented in Table 9. The first column
reports the fixed effects model regression results for the 1980 data set, which, despite using less
appropriate proxies for market size, infrastructure, and labor force, allows for a much larger time span.
As the results indicate, the coefficients for trade openness, infrastructure, natural resources, and labor
force are all significant and have the predicted signs. Particularly, countries with higher trade levels,
better infrastructure32, more abundant natural resources, and a larger labor force are more attractive
to investors. On the other hand, the coefficients for macroeconomic stability, labor skill, financial
development, and especially market size, are not significant.
The fact that the coefficients for both labor force and natural resources are significant and positive,
while for labor skill it is not, reinforces the importance of the resource seeking over market or
efficiency seeking characteristic of foreign investment to developing countries during the period 1980
– 2014. Indeed, the coefficient for labor force is significant at the 1% level while the other significant
coefficients are only so at the 10% level. Thus, labor force is the leading determinant of FDI for this
data set. In addition, the insignificance of the coefficient for market size further supports the fact that
market seeking FDI was not the prominent type of FDI during this period. However, the market size
variable for the 1980 data set is measured with a less appropriate proxy. Since labor force is measured
by working age population, this proxy for labor force could also diminish the significance of market
size, as the working age population could also be considered a proxy for market size.
Column 2 of Table 9 reports the random effects model regression results for the 1990 data set,
which includes the improved proxies for market size, infrastructure, and labor force. Though the
magnitude is rather small, the coefficient for market size is significant with a positive sign.
30

Variables which are first order differenced to obtain stationary for the 1980 data set are domestic credit to private sector, GDP per
capita, trade, electric power transmission and distribution losses, and gross secondary school enrollment. All other variables are
expressed in levels.
31 Variables which are first order differenced to obtain stationary for the 1990 data set are domestic credit to private sector, GDP per
capita (PPP), mobile cellular subscriptions, gross secondary school enrollment, and labor force participation rate. All other variables
are expressed in levels.
32 Since the proxy for infrastructure in this data set is electric power transmission and distribution losses, a negative coefficient for the
variable implies a positive effect of infrastructure on FDI.
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Macroeconomic stability 33 , trade openness, labor skill, and infrastructure all have significant
coefficients as well, with the predicted signs. On the other hand, the coefficients for financial
development, natural resources, and labor force participation are not significant. These findings from
the 1990 data set suggest that a larger consumer base, less macroeconomic instability, more trade
openness, higher quality of labor, and better infrastructure all promote FDI.
In both the 1990 and 1980 data sets, two consistently significant variables are trade openness and
infrastructure. Interestingly, infrastructure shows a significant and positive impact on FDI inflows
into developing countries both when measured by hard infrastructure in the 1980 data set and by
telecommunications in the 1990 data set. These findings imply that it is crucial for developing
countries to lower their trade barriers and invest in all types of infrastructure to attract FDI inflows.
Comparison of the regression results between the 1990 and 1980 data sets also indicate a sectoral
shift in FDI inflows. The regression results for the extended period 1980 – 2014 reveal that market
size, labor skill, and macroeconomic stability are all not important determinants of FDI, but they do
play a substantial role during the period 1990 – 2014. On the other hand, labor force and natural
resources are significant determinants of FDI during the extended period 1980 – 2014, but not during
the period 1990 – 2014. All of these differences indicate that FDI investment may have shifted away
from primary product industries after the 1990s. Moreover, such changes in FDI determinants signal
a transition in investors’ incentives from resource seeking to market and efficiency seeking.
Column 3 of Table 9 presents the fixed effects model regression results for the Barro&Lee data
set, where all the data are averaged every 5 years except for the labor skill proxy. This data set
substitutes the flow proxy for labor skill, gross secondary enrollment, with a stock measure, the
percentage of the population having completed secondary school, but keeps the same proxies as the
1980 data set for all other variables. For this data set, only labor force and trade openness are found
to be significant determinants of FDI with the appropriate signs. Despite a better proxy, labor skill is
still insignificant for the period 1980 – 2014, while labor force remains strongly significant at the 1%
level. This finding reinforces that human capital is possibly a less important factor prior to the 1990s.
Furthermore, the coefficient for trade openness is consistently significant also for this data set,
fortifying the importance of economic openness as an FDI determinant.
VIII. Conclusion
In our paper, we examine the determinants that make developing countries more attractive as a
destination for FDI. Our findings are in line with the observed global trend of a sectoral change in
FDI during the 1990s. Since 1990, human capital, macroeconomic stability, and market size have all
had a statistically significant impact on FDI inflows into developing countries. When extending the
time span to 1980 – 2014, we find that natural resources and labor force are crucial determinants of
FDI, while human capital, macroeconomic stability, and market size are not. Thus, investment from
1990 till nowadays has shifted away from primary products and more towards service and knowledge
– capital intensive manufacturing industries. More importantly, across time spans and proxies,
infrastructure and trade are proven to be critical factors driving FDI flows.

33

Since macroeconomic stability is measured by the level of inflation, a decrease in inflation attracts more FDI inflows.
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Unfortunately, financial development is not found to be an important determinant despite a sound
theoretical argument. We expect that better measurements and a longer time span into the future could
eventually lead to the significance of this factor. Moreover, our research is restricted to traditional
determinants of FDI. Political and institutional variables may also determine the flow of FDI as those
variables indicate locational advantages of the host countries, but these data are only available after
1998.
Our analysis and findings suggest that developing countries will benefit from trade openness and
quality infrastructure. The more a country trades, the more FDI inflows it attracts. Similarly, better
infrastructure, which incentivizes efficiency seeking investment, has been especially compelling to
FDI investors in recent decades. Furthermore, as the economies of these countries become more
sophisticated, a human capital stock and large consumer base are fundamental conditions to maintain
inflows of FDI.
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Appendix

Table 1. Data Sets and Countries
Data Set

N

T

Countries

1990 - 2014

45

25 (21 African countries)
Algeria, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Arab Rep. of Egypt, Ghana,
Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,
Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo,
Tunisia, Uganda, Zimbabwe
(8 Asian countries)
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand

1980 - 2014

30

35 (11 African countries)
Algeria, Cameroon, Arab Rep. of Egypt,
Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco,
Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Zimbabwe
(8 Asian countries)
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand

Barro&Lee 34

7

(12 African countries)
Algeria, Cameroon, Arab Rep. of Egypt,
Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco,
Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia,
Zimbabwe
(9 Asian countries)
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand

(13 Latin, Central American, and
Caribbean countries)
Belize, Bolivia, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, St. Lucia
(3 other countries)
Fiji, Turkey, Jordan
(9 Latin, Central American, and
Caribbean countries)
Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama
(2 other countries)
Jordan, Turkey
(11 Latin, Central American, and
Caribbean countries)
Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cote d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama
(2 other countries)
Jordan, Turkey
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Table 2. Data Sources and Measurements
Determinant
FDI

Variable
Dependent

Financial
Development

Financial
development

Market Size

GDP per
capita

Macroeconomic
Factors
Trade Openness
Infrastructure
Natural
Resources

Labor Factors

Stability

Measurement
Foreign direct investment,
net inflows (% of GDP)
Domestic credit to private sector
(% of GDP)
GDP per capita
(constant 2010 US$)
GDP per capita, PPP
(constant 2011 international $)
Inflation (GDP deflator)

Trade level

Exports plus imports (% of GDP)
Electric power transmission and
Infrastructure distribution losses (% of output)
capability
Mobile cellular subscriptions
(per 100 people)
Natural
Fuel exports
resources
(% of merchandise exports)
Labor force participation rate, total
(% of total population ages 15+)
Labor force
Population ages 15-64
(% of total)
School enrollment, secondary
(% gross)
Labor skill
Secondary education completion
(% of total population ages 15+)

Abbreviation

Data Sources

FDIGDP

World Bank

DOMCRD

World Bank

GDPCAP
World Bank
GDPPPP
INFL

World Bank

TRADE

World Bank

ELEC
World Bank
MOBILE
FUELEX

World Bank

LBFC
World Bank
WORKPOP
EDUFLOW

World Bank

EDUSTOCK

Barro&Lee

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (1980 Data Set)
Variable
FDIGDP
GDPCAP
INFL
TRADE
EDUFLOW
ELEC
DOMCRD
FUELEX
WORKPOP

Obs.
1044
1050
1050
1046
857
1020
1035
963
1050

Mean
1.987084
3116.338
11.30402
67.48552
54.77825
15.0213
38.35254
17.94059
58.75293

Std. dev.
2.416973
2299.442
16.55893
36.62216
21.50888
7.112403
29.25674
26.24519
5.746506

Min
-11.53026
344.6272
-27.04865
6.320343
7.7524
0
1.542268
.0000754
46.95173

Max
23.53736
11246.14
139.6588
220.4073
120.3267
49.26698
166.5041
99.6565
74.35314
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (1990 Data Set)
Variable
FDIGDP
GDPPPP
INFL
TRADE
EDUFLOW
MOBILE
DOMCRD
FUELEX
LBFC

Obs.
1122
1125
1125
1120
861
1122
1104
1009
1125

Mean
2.742811
6396.313
9.809856
71.57953
56.30311
31.67029
38.71318
14.24107
64.3824

Std. dev.
3.062411
4479.931
15.44626
35.89428
24.85612
41.54509
33.0289
23.78299
10.95703

Min
-6.89768
485.8201
-27.04865
11.08746
6.24449
0
1.615531
0
39.2

Max
23.53736
24459.78
159.267
220.4073
120.3267
180.6992
166.5041
99.6565
89

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics (Barro&Lee Data Set)
Variable
FDIGDP
GDPCAP
INFL
TRADE
EDUSTOCK
ELEC
DOMCRD
FUELEX
WORKPOP

Obs.
238
266
266
266
266
266
265
261
266

Mean
1.921737
3152.128
59.44121
66.77445
1.791867
15.21994
39.08064
14.29461
58.65933

Std. dev.
2.057159
2430.382
334.8055
34.48819
.8417948
7.511574
29.39362
20.93473
5.650175

Min
-3.667731
366.0883
-6.21548
12.876
.3872252
0
1.918805
.0007323
46.98969

Max
15.52454
11525.63
3858.509
205.5394
4.58179
72.82682
148.3103
98.04257
74.09593

Table 6. Panel Unit Root Tests (1980 Data Set)
Variables

ln FDIGDP

GDPCAP

INFL

Panel Unit Root Tests
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis

Levels
Test Statistic
NA
-6.3856***
118.7700***
NA
NA
NA
11.1179
20.1632
8.3812
16.2357
108.3527***
1.0367
-6.3293***
-13.3801***
241.0470***
-5.0451***
29.4189***
0.4446***

First Order Differences
Test Statistic
NA
--NA
NA
NA
-6.4001***
-11.0886***
252.5382***
-5.9328***
16.4613***
0.2499***
------16
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Levin, Lin, and Chu
-2.2672**
-16.2779***
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
-0.9462
-17.8670***
ADF Fisher
71.1832
559.4182***
TRADE
Breitung
-1.1563
-12.6465***
Hadri
66.0675***
-1.2802
Harris-Tzavalis
0.8824**
-0.0304***
Levin, Lin, and Chu
NA
NA
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
13.7750
-8.7191***
ADF Fisher
12.5123
156.9582***
EDUFLOW
Breitung
NA
NA
Hadri
NA
NA
Harris-Tzavalis
NA
NA
Levin, Lin, and Chu
-0.3924
-13.8949***
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
-2.4595***
-19.4098***
ADF Fisher
50.6923
570.9633***
ELEC
Breitung
-2.3562***
-12.6380***
Hadri
52.8001***
-2.4006
Harris-Tzavalis
0.7899***
-0.3018***
Levin, Lin, and Chu
NA
NA
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
4.0768
-15.3183***
ADF Fisher
54.8729
382.0041***
DOMCRD
Breitung
NA
NA
Hadri
NA
NA
Harris-Tzavalis
NA
NA
Levin, Lin, and Chu
NA
NA
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
-4.7701***
-ADF Fisher
191.9450***
-FUELEX
Breitung
NA
NA
Hadri
NA
NA
Harris-Tzavalis
NA
NA
Levin, Lin, and Chu
-10.4010***
-0.1447
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
6.7166
1.0506
ADF Fisher
150.6813***
58.4743
WORKPOP
Breitung
21.1176
-0.0964
Hadri
115.8013***
39.3851***
Harris-Tzavalis
0.9915
0.8958
Notes: For all tests, the null hypothesis is that panels contain a unit root, except for the Hadri test whose null
hypothesis is that all panels are stationary. Only the Im, Pesaran, and Shin and ADF Fisher tests are
applicable to unbalanced time series. Stationarity is only checked for first order difference if the levels are
non-stationary.
*Significance at the 10% level.
**Significance at the 5% level.
***Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 7. Panel Unit Root Tests (1990 Data Set)
Variables

ln FDIGDP

GDPPPP

INFL

TRADE

EDUFLOW

MOBILE

DOMCRD

Panel Unit Root Tests
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis
Levin, Lin, and Chu
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
ADF Fisher
Breitung
Hadri
Harris-Tzavalis

Levels
Statistic
NA
-8.7268***
283.4389***
NA
NA
NA
7.8507
17.5275
28.5076
16.9830
93.8330***
1.0255
-12.6973***
-12.8666***
438.9339***
-7.5117***
31.2093***
0.4517***
-2.7310***
-1.9475**
89.0576
-1.7698**
48.2042***
0.7907***
NA
11.4530
45.1980
NA
NA
NA
NA
29.0531
33.3889
NA
NA
NA
NA
3.7699
161.6685***
NA
NA
NA

First Order Differences
Statistic
NA
--NA
NA
NA
-7.2869***
-12.2792***
285.9393***
-7.6521***
7.7361***
0.1294***
-------16.2144***
-17.7009***
611.9614***
-16.6460***
-1.6494
-0.1846***
NA
NA
147.0865***
NA
NA
NA
NA
-4.0588***
109.5309*
NA
NA
NA
NA
-13.8690***
500.8613***
NA
NA
NA
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Levin, Lin, and Chu
NA
NA
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
-2.5230***
-ADF Fisher
179.8638***
-FUELEX
Breitung
NA
NA
Hadri
NA
NA
Harris-Tzavalis
NA
NA
Levin, Lin, and Chu
-6.0963***
-5.7365***
Im, Pesaran, and Shin
1.1980
-8.8187***
ADF Fisher
124.7341***
304.6129***
LBFC
Breitung
7.5511
-7.9389***
Hadri
80.5125***
6.8494***
Harris-Tzavalis
0.9456
0.2272***
Notes: For all tests, the null hypothesis is that panels contain a unit root, except for the Hadri test whose null
hypothesis is that all panels are stationary. Only the Im, Pesaran, and Shin and ADF Fisher tests are
applicable to unbalanced time series. Stationarity is only checked for first order difference if the levels are
non-stationary.
*Significance at the 10% level.
**Significance at the 5% level.
***Significance at the 1% level.

Table 8: Fixed/Random Effects versus Pooled OLS Model Tests
Observations
Countries
Period

1980 Data Set
642

1990 Data Set
639

Barro&Lee Data Set
226

30

45

1980 – 2014

1990 – 2014

34
1980 – 2014
(5 year averages)
4.98***

17.92***
F – Test (FE vs Pooled)
Breusch and Pagan
344.08***
Lagrangian Multiplier Test
(RE vs Pooled)
Hausman Test
23.92***
5.88
20.15***
(FE vs RE)
Notes: Numbers reported are the test statistics. The Hausman tests are calculated using the estimated
disturbance variance from the efficient estimator.
*Significance at the 10% level.
**Significance at the 5% level.
***Significance at the 1% level.
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Table 9. Regression Results
Dependent Variable
ln FDIGDP
GDPCAP
Market Size

1980 Data Set
Fixed effects
5.67E - 04
(1.48)

GDPPPP
Macroeconomic
Stability

INFL

Trade Openness

TRADE
EDUFLOW

Labor Skill

7.36E - 04
(0.19)
.0130*
(1.76)
.0122
(0.79)

1990 Data Set
Random effects

3.75E-04*
(1.68)
-.0114***
(-2.71)
.0113***
(3.05)
.0333**
(2.17)

Infrastructure

-.0191*
(-1.72)

MOBILE
Financial
Development

DOMCRD

Natural Resources

FUELEX
WORKPOP

Labor Force

1.85E – 03
(0.35)
.0119*
(1.87)
.1941***
(4.70)

.0239***
(4.26)
-.0026
(-0.34)
.0057
(1.29)

Observations
Countries

-11.7468***
(-4.71)
642
30

-7.99E-04
(-0.01)
-90.4215
(-1.24)
639
45

Period

1980 – 2014

1990 – 2014

7.41***
0.3351
0.0761

62.29***
0.1283
0.2661

LBFC
Constant

F – Test/Wald Test (model)
Within R-squared
Between R-squared

-.0028
(-0.41)
.0126**
(2.39)

.0267
(1.56)
-.0008
(-0.04)

EDUSTOCK
ELEC

Barro&Lee
Fixed effects
-.0002
(-1.23)

-.0041
(-0.81)
.0098
(1.17)
.1789***
(4.39)

-10.9596***
(-5.97)
226
34
1980 – 2014
(5 year average)
12.75***
0.4440
0.0916

Notes: Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation through cluster-robust VCE
estimators provided by STATA. t-values are in parentheses. Data sources and definitions of variables are
provided in Table 2.
*Significance at the 10% level.
**Significance at the 5% level.
***Significance at the 1% level.
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